Introduction and background
For some decades now, economists have focused much of their attention on assessing macroeconomic variations as an interaction between government behavior and market forces. This led to the development of the models of political cycles. Political business cycles (PBCs) are cycles in macroeconomic variables such as inflation, unemployment, output, and so forth, which are caused by the electoral cycle. These models are categorized broadly into the "opportunistic" (electoralist) and the "partisan." The "opportunistic" has it that all governments, irrespective of their ideological orientation, apply the same expansionary policies ahead of elections in order to increase their popularity and brighten their chances of being re-elected. The "partisan" proclaims that right-wing and left-wing governments select different policies and produce different results that reveal the preferences of their classdefined main political electorates. Thus, cycles are caused by differences among parties in their philosophy and economic goals.
With the "opportunistic" model, in the immediate period after elections, the government causes a recession through contractionary monetary policy to bring down inflationary anticipations. The incumbent government lowers economic activity so as to keep expected inflation low up to the time immediately before the next election, with the intention that a given rate of economic expansion as a result of a monetary surprise can be attained at a comparatively low inflation rate. The incumbent then stimulates the economy using expansionary monetary policy, causing unemployment to fall owing to the high unanticipated growth of money.
Voter satisfaction is maximized by the levels of monetary expansion and unemployment in the election period. In the following election cycle, the same conduct is repeated, with a contractionary monetary policy to lower inflation expectations. Therefore, the likelihood of influencing the possibility of re-election, coupled with the economic structure, produces a cycle in economic activity which would be absent with a planner with an infinite vanishing point. Thus, the political cycle causes a cycle in inflation and economic activity.
According to Block (2002) , Sub-Saharan Africa offers conducive ground for the study of PBCs because Africa is concurrently going through a prolonged process of economic reform. Block (2002) further stated that the period from 1989 to 1995 mark a vivid transition in the politics of Africa, marked particularly by improved political rivalry and leadership turnover. Even though there were elections in Africa before 1989, this was described by Bratton and Van De Walle (1997) as "largely non-competitive affairs in which, by foregone conclusion, a dominant ruling party won all available seats." However, these same people from 1990 to 1994 reported a multiple of the number of countries in Africa that held competitive legislative polls (38 countries out of 47), as compared to nine in the course of the previous five years. This trend has been improving till now which therefore suggests that democracy has come to stay in Africa largely and election cycles have been the order of the day.
There have been several works devoted to exploring the empirical legitimacy of the assumptions of the two models. Nevertheless, according to Franzese (2002) , most of these works underrate essential differences in the contexts in which voted, partisan incumbent governments formulate policy. For instance, as pointed out by Franzese (2002) , the regularity, content and extent of political cycles can be determined heavily by multiple interplays among domestic and international politico-economic interest structures, conditions and institutions, thus, political cycles can be "context-conditional." Kneebone and Mckenzie (2001) noted that all the above factors are hard to control for in multi-country studies with the use of panel data, and any effort to do so will, by all means, be imperfect. Conversely, extant works at the single-country level completely focus on evidence from advanced economies, like the USA. Particularly, little is known about the influences of political processes on small open economies. We expect political cycles to vary in open economies because the works of Alesina et al. (1997) and Franzese (2002) provide a solid motivation as they pointed out that domestic policymakers in small open economies might retain less independence over certain policies, or certain policies might be less effective economically, and therefore, political cycles might be less noticeable than their larger, less-exposed counterparts.
This study will, therefore, focus on testing the opportunistic model largely. It seeks to empirically assess the effect of PBCs on economic growth in the light of money supply in the African continent.
Problem statement and research objectives
A common characteristic of many empirical works on political cycles is their dependence on the notion that politicians are either partisan or opportunistic. However, in practice, the two assumptions may be two sides of the same coin. Politicians may be required to act in a partisan way in order to preserve the loyalty of their voters, and therefore, secure satisfactory electoral results (Block, 2002) . Drazen et al. (2000) stated differently that they may pass very dissimilar policies both because they are concern about the welfare of some groups in society and also about the maximization of their own welfare function, which is contingent on them holding office, according to the opportunistic models. The implication is that if external economic restraints, like European integration and globalization, bring about a convergence around market-friendly policies and make the task of generating different macroeconomic results very tough, then these restraints can also drive political cycles in the way that opportunistic models foresee. Thus, all politicians will act largely the same way and take part in policy manipulations that are relaxed to work with in the short-run.
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Some authors including Block (2002) and Mosley and Chiripanhura (2016) investigate the existence of PBCs in Africa by looking at the changes in fiscal and monetary policy variables such as fiscal deficits, expenditures, money supply, inflation and so forth in an election year. The changes in these policy variables may be due to other factors such as campaign expenditures from opposition political parties and private investors who sponsor partisan campaign for their own benefit after the election, and not necessarily expenditure from the government. Therefore, the aim of this study is not to replicate what they did but to see whether changes in these policy variables (represented by money supply) are indeed caused by government expenditure in an election year, and how this translates to economic growth in the region. We will employ panel regression technics which will provide us with more robust findings that can be used for policymaking and implementation in Africa and other developing countries concerning the issue of PBCs and economic growth.
Owing to the above discussions, the general objective of this study is to verify the existence and assess the contribution of the PBC to economic growth in Africa. We considered two research questions:
RQ1. Does election cycle have an impact on money growth in the light of government expenditure in Africa?
RQ2. Does election cycle have an impact on economic growth in the light of money supply in Africa?
Literature review
There has been an extensive argument about the existence of PBCs both in the developed and developing world. Incidentally, the emerging literature has significantly illustrated the presence of PBCs in African countries. In this section, we present a theoretical argument and an up to date review of the suitable empirical literature regarding the existence of PBCs and how it affects economic performance.
Theoretical argument
Ever since the ground-breaking work by Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1980) economists and political scientists have refined and tested the implications of the theory of PBCs by conducting many empirical analyses. The assumption of the earliest model is that electorates based their decision of whom to vote on the pre-electoral economic performance of the government. Supposing such electorates were taught to implement expansionary monetary and fiscal policies prior to elections to gather political support, as a result of real economic growth and incomes rises. However, a host of empirical works, including that of Lewis-Beck (1990) and Drazen (2000) from advanced democracies using cross-national data, did not produce convincing evidence that pre-electoral increases in economic performance are achieved by governments in the form of growth, incomes and a temporal decrease in unemployment rates. Additionally, the assumption that electorates shortsightedly decide their voting behavior on the basis of short-term, pre-electoral performance of the economy was too strong to be believable. Nevertheless, another aspect of empirical works (including Kohno and Nishizawa, 1990; Alesina et al., 1992; Reid, 1998) has it that governments in advanced democracies influence economic policies prior to elections, which leads to the fueling of fiscal deficits in election year and high inflation after elections. That is to say that pre-electoral manipulation of the economy does not necessarily affect real growth rates strongly, however, governments tend to implement expansionary fiscal policy in election years, which results in fiscal imbalance and inflation. Political economists in trying to provide a theoretical clarification to this puzzle presented the notion of "information asymmetries" between a government and electorates (Rogoff, 1990) .
As electorates are not able to collect information on the de facto competence of the government, they try to evaluate it based on the previous policy performance of the government and take a decision whether or not to give their vote to the government in power. The governing party knowing this makes effort to show their capability by manipulating economic policies prior to elections, which leads to fiscal deficits and high inflation in an election year. And as found by William and Emmanuel (2012) , high government indebtedness affects economic growth negatively.
Empirical review
Block (2002) shows evidence of the presence of PBCs in the emerging democracies of the developing countries. He uses data from 44 Sub-Saharan African countries spanning the period 1980-1995 to test for the existence of PBCs. Using the GMM as his main estimation technique, he discovers systematic electorally timed interventions in nine cases of monetary and fiscal policy in Africa. His results were in line with the predictions of rational opportunistic PBC theory in which politicians concerned mainly in re-election manipulate monetary and fiscal policy instruments to win the support of rational retrospective voters. Block et al. (2003) investigate the issue of the PBC in Africa. They use annual data for 44 countries and employ panel estimation techniques for their analysis. Their findings show a strong support for the hypothesis that political cycles are present when there is multiparty competition in an election. They also found moderate support for the hypothesis that larger cycles are seen in "founding" elections. They added that their findings have implications for democratic transitions and economic and political reform compatibility in emerging democracies. Efthyvoulou (2011) investigates the presence of political cycles in a small open economy. He uses data from Cyprus from 1978 to 2006, to explore the way they are conditioned upon external economic constraints, for example, European integration and globalization. He had two basic findings. He, first, found evidence of partisan shifts in economic policies and outcomes, and added that these effects seem to decline with the progress of globalization and to disappear in the run-up to EMU. Second, he found evidence of electoral shifts in some of the fiscal balance's subcomponents. Contrary to partisan distinctions, however, he explained that these opportunistic effects turn out to be more noticeable as globalization continues.
Enkelmann and Leibrecht (2013) examine electorally driven public expenditure in newly democratized Eastern European countries. They use disaggregated expenditure data and found that in total spending and in specific sub-categories, election cycles exist mainly in these countries. The authors, however, noted that electorally driven expenditure policies are not effective means to improve the re-election likelihood. Mosley and Chiripanhura (2016) use empirical data for 51 African countries to analyze PBCs. They employ the fixed effects (FEs) estimation technics and with the help of country case studies, they argued as follows: first, there is no homogeneity in the African PBC and that it happens relatively occasionally in purported "dominant-party systems" where the stimulus of a pre-election confers a little political advantage. Second, they indicate that election cycle does not necessarily cause institutional damage in countries where they occur. And that whether it causes damage or not does not depend so much on whether there is an electoral cycle but on whether this cycle brings down or intensifies fears of an unfair allocation of resources. Higashijima (2016) examines this subject in dictatorships and argue that when dictators can reliably signal popularity through elections, they have a strong motivation to overspend prior to elections. He used data from 131 countries spanning the period 1970-2008 and came out with two findings. First, he argued that in electoral years, fiscal deficits exist in authoritarian regimes with larger magnitude than their democratic counterparts. Lastly, autocrats with semi-competitive, less fraudulent elections among authoritarian regimes are almost certain to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy before elections. He also found the relationship between election year fiscal deficits and political regime types to be non-linear.
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Political business cycles Funashima (2016) harnesses wavelet (ripple) approaches to examine the existence of an opportunistic PBC in monetary policy using the US economy as a case study. He found that the Federal Reserve is inclined to cut the funds rate before presidential elections with the exception of the 1990s. This political manipulation according to him is significantly affecting output in many eras. Besides, central bank independence in the last three decades is comparatively reinforced. The author further noted that these results are robust even after controlling for the effects of government spending. He, however, attributed the explanation of his evidence to changes in voters' preferences.
Considering the above discussion, one can say that the existence of PBCs and its effect on economic performance is firmly established in the literature, particularly for African economies. However, the argument seems to be one-sided so far. The current study, therefore, seeks to verify whether changes in money supply in an election year are as a result of African governments' expenditure in anticipation of their re-election.
Model specification, estimation strategy and data
In addressing the issue of PBCs and money growth, the study investigates the influence of election cycles on money supply in the light of government expenditure. We follow the work of Mosley and Chiripanhura (2016) and consequently estimate the following empirical model: 
where M represents money supply measured by M2/GDP; ELE a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there have been presidential elections in that year and 0 otherwise; PREELE represents a dummy variable that equals 1 in a pre-election year, and 0 otherwise; GOVEXP the government expenditure measured by general government final consumption expenditure; HHFCE the household final consumption expenditure and GNE represents gross national expenditure included as control variables; α i represents country FEs which control for time-invariant unobserved country characteristics; ρ t represents year FEs which control for macroeconomic changes; and π i,t is the random error term of the equation.
In addressing the issue of PBCs and economic growth, we refer to Chiripanhura and Niño-Zarazúa's (2015) model developed from the model of opportunistic incumbency and subsequently estimate the following model to investigate the influence of election cycles on GDP per capita in the light of money supply: 
where Y is our economic growth variable proxied by the log of GDP per capita; INF represents inflation measured as an annual percentage, GDP deflator; DEBT and TRADE represent external debt stock and trade openness, respectively, which are included as control variables; PREELE, M, and ELE remain same as previously defined; λ i represents country FEs which control for time-invariant unobserved country characteristics; η t are year FEs which control for macroeconomic changes; and μ i,t is the random error term of the equation. We source data on all variables from World Bank's World Development Indicators and self-computation for 39 African countries from 1990 to 2014.
Data analysis and discussion of results
This paper examines the existence of PBC and how it translates to economic growth in the Africa region. The empirical analysis is as follows.
Descriptive analysis
In this section, we give a brief discussion of the basic statistical properties of the variables used in the model over the period 1990-2014. Among the summary statistics examined for the pooled sample are shown in Table I .
The standard deviation column from Table I measures the dispersion of the variables from their means. The presence of outliers is indicated by large standard errors which significantly influence the data. The difference between the maximum and minimum values of the variables can also help to determine the spread. The bigger the gap of a variable, the larger the standard deviation of the said variable.
Per capita GDP averaged about 2,780.71. The maximum and minimum values of per capita GDP were 87,998.45 and −10.06, respectively, over the period. The average of money supply (M ) for the period was about 32.56, with about 0.83 minimum, and about 182.28 maximum. Breakdown of the rest of the variables is all shown in the table. 
Empirical results and discussion
The results shown in Tables III and IV are obtained from estimating Equations (1) and (2) using the FE and random effect (RE) techniques. The outcome of Hausman's test in Table AI accepts the null hypothesis of no correlation between the independent variables and the country heterogeneity error term, making the use of the random effect model (REM) appropriate. While that of Table AII rejects the null hypothesis, recommending the use of fixed effect model (FEM). Therefore, we concentrate on the parameter estimates obtained under the FE estimator in Table III and under the RE estimator in Table IV with much emphasis on the sixth column. To correct for the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we run a robust command as part of our panel estimation techniques. This method gives standard errors of regression coefficients that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
In Table III , the coefficient of ELEGOVEXP is positive across all regressions and statistically significant in columns 2, 5 and 6, therefore we do not reject the hypothesis that government expenditure leads to money growth in an election year more than non-election years. It is, however, not significant in columns 1, 3 and 4 where we did not control for time effects. We follow the outcome of Hausman's test and concentrate on the results of the RE model. To be specific, the results in column 6 indicate that for every extra 1 percent increase in government expenditure, the money supply will increase by 0.151 percent in election years over and above any increment we see in non-election years, all else equal. In this case, every 1 percent increase in government expenditure leads to 0.757 percent[1] more increment in money supply in election years.
To conclude, our results support the hypothesis of a positive and significant impact of ELEGOVEXP on money supply. That is, PBCs exist in African countries at the aggregate level. This outcome conforms to the findings of Block (2002) , Block et al. (2003) and Mosley and Chiripanhura (2016) who reached the same conclusion for African countries. Our finding is also consistent with an opportunistic model of PBC which maintains that incumbent governments stimulate their economies using expansionary monetary policy for the period just immediately before the next election to boost their re-election chances.
The coefficient of GOVEXP is also positive and significant in column 6. This indicates that higher government expenditure leads to money growth in an economy. This follows logic and in line with the proposition of the opportunistic model. However, contrary to our expectations is the fact that the coefficients of ELE and PREELE are negative and significant. The possible explanation for this is that people channel less of their monies into investment in pre-election and election years as compared to other years, thereby making money supply increase in these years. This is probably because of the uncertainty of the political outcome. This contradicts the findings of Block (2002) and Mosley and Chiripanhura (2016) , and also with the predictions of rational opportunistic PBC theory. Household final consumption expenditure (HHFCE ) and gross national expenditure (GNE) did not significantly influence money growth in column 6.
The coefficient of ELEM in Table IV is negative across all regressions and statistically significant in columns 2, 4 and 6, we, therefore, do not reject the hypothesis that money supply leads to economic growth in election years less than non-election years since our Table III . Estimates of Equation (1) Table IV .
Estimates of Equation (2) using random effects and fixed effects, 1990-2014 concentration is on the sixth column. Here again, we refer to the outcome of Hausman's test in Table AII and concentrate on the FE model. The coefficient's insignificance in column 5 is probably because of the fact that introducing many dummy variables has multicollinearity and degree of freedom problem (Gichamo, 2012) . Specifically, the results in column 6 indicate that for every extra 1 percent increase in money supply, GDP per capita will increase by 0.0022 percent in non-election years over and above any increment we see in election years, all other things being equal. In this case, every 1 percent increases in money supply leads to 0.011 percent[2] less increment in economic growth in election years. In effect, our results support the hypothesis of a negative and significant impact of ELEM on GDP per capita, indicating that, at the aggregate level, PBCs do not translate to economic growth in African countries. This outcome is consistent with another strand of empirical works including Kohno and Nishizawa (1990) , Alesina et al. (1992) and Reid (1998) who maintained that governments in advanced democracies influence economic policies prior to elections, which leads to the fueling of fiscal deficits in election year and high inflation after elections. That is to say that pre-electoral manipulation of the economy does not necessarily affect real growth rates strongly.
The coefficients of M and INF are also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that money growth and inflation in real terms contribute to economic growth in Africa. These findings are intuitive since not all levels of inflation are hazardous to economic growth and money growth is an integral part of the economic performance. However, the election and pre-election year dummies (ELE and PREELE ), as well as the countries' debt stock (DEBT ) and trade openness (TRADE ) did not significantly influence real economic growth across all regressions in Table IV .
Conclusion and recommendations
The main objectives of the study were to confirm the existence of the PBC in Africa and to assess how that translates to economic growth in the region. The paper uses the money supply (M ) as a policy variable and PGDP to measure economic growth. To measure the impact of government expenditure in an election year on the policy variable, we interacted government expenditure with the election dummy ELE and to see the impact of the policy variable in an election year on economic growth, we interacted "ELE" with the policy variable (M ) to get ELEGOVEXP and ELEM, respectively. The ELE dummy takes the value 1 if there have been presidential elections in that year and 0 otherwise. To get a minimum error term, we controlled for the phenomena that affect money supply and economic growth. Using Equations (1) and (2), we estimated an unbalanced panel model using data from 39 African countries over the period 1990-2014. We presented robust estimation results of the FE and REMs. The robust estimation was to control for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Following Hausman's test acceptance of the null hypothesis of no correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors suggesting the appropriateness of the REM over the FEM in Equation (1) and its rejection of the REM in Equation (2), we concentrate on the results from the REM in (1) and on the FEM in (2). We found a positive and significant relationship between money supply and government expenditure in an election year indicating the existence of the PBC in Africa. We also found a negative and significant relationship between PGDP and money growth in an election year indicating that at the aggregate level, PBCs do not translate to economic growth in African countries. We thus conclude that PBC exists in Africa and it does more harm than good to African economies.
Following the results obtained from the study, policy recommendations are suggested as follows. To begin with, domestic policymakers and international society can more effectively correct the expenditure of African incumbent governments in election years if
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Political business cycles they work hand in hand. To achieve this, in addition to domestic policymakers limiting borrowing by an incumbent in pre-election and election years, the international society can complement this by limiting the economic resources that incumbents can use through international economic policy and coercive diplomacy. For instance, in line with the suggestion of Ahmed (2012) by reducing the amount of foreign aid and international remittances in an election year, they can limit the financial resources available to incumbents. This has the potential of fueling electoral fraud.
Finally, as pointed out by Hallerberg et al. (2002) , markets tend to react negatively when a country runs an excessive deficit. As a result, African policymakers should take measures to eliminate or lessen the scale of PBCs. This can be done through sensitizing African electorates on the dangers such cycles have on their economies and how to make an informed decision. Our inability to find a suitable instrument to account for endogenous election is a potential limitation to this study. Therefore, future works in this area can account for that and such a work will add more impetus to this study.
Notes
1. We take the partial derivative of Equation (1) with respect to GOVEXP and set the dummy (ELE) to 1. From column 6 of Table III , we add the coefficients of GOVEXP and ELEGOVEXP. Thus, 0.606 + 0.151 ¼ 0.757.
